05.24.10

California Foreclosures and Deficiency Judgments (2010-12)

Posted in Litigation, Real Estate Law at 09:53 by Administrator

Introduction

There are two types of foreclosure actions in California: judicial and non-judicial. The vast majority of California foreclosure actions proceed as non-judicial foreclosures because judicial foreclosures take much longer to complete and to become final than do non-judicial foreclosures and, therefore, generally are more expensive for lenders.

California’s anti-deficiency statutes preclude or limit lenders’ ability to obtain personal judgments against defaulting borrowers in many situations where proceeds from the sale of a property which has been foreclosed upon fail to extinguish the outstanding debt which was secured by the property. See, California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 580a, 580b, 580d, 726(a).

C.C.P. § 580d generally prohibits deficiency judgments after any foreclosure sale, judicial or non-judicial, of property that is secured by a third-party purchase money trust deed or mortgage on owner-occupied residential property, or on a seller-held purchase money trust deed or mortgage on any kind of property. All standard purchase-money transactions are subject to the C.C.P. § 580b bar to deficiency judgments. Spangler v. Memel, 7 Cal.3d 603, 610 (1972).

Non-Judicial Foreclosure

By choosing non-judicial foreclosure, the creditor waives the right to a deficiency judgment. Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal.2d 35, 43-44 (1963). When a deficiency judgment is barred following a non-judicial foreclosure under a deed of trust, the trustee has a duty to cancel the underlying note. Kerivan v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 147 C.A.3d 225, 230-231.

Section 580d does not, however, bar recovery on a debt by a sold-out junior lienholder whose security has been rendered worthless by non-judicial foreclosure of a senior lienholder. Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal.2d at 43.

Judicial Foreclosure

A creditor may generally obtain a deficiency judgment following a judicial foreclosure, except where the purchase-money rule would bar such a judgment. C.C.P. § 580b. When recovery of a deficiency judgment is allowed, recovery is limited to the amount by which the outstanding debt exceeds either the fair market value of the property at the time of sale or, if less, the sale price. C.C.P. § 580a.

The purchase-money rule does not apply in cases where the property has been refinanced and the purchase-money loan replaced with a different loan which also is secured by the subject property. Union Bank v. Wendland, 54 C.A.3d. 393, 399-400 (1976).

Deficiency Judgments Generally

The “One-Form-of-Action” rule provides that foreclosure is the only form of action to recover any debt or enforce any right secured by a deed of trust or mortgage. C.C.P. § 726(a). The rule has two purposes: to compel a secured creditor to resort first to the security and to protect the debtor from multiple suits when a creditor holds multiple security interests. Savings Bank v. Central Market Co., 122 Cal. 28 (1898).

The security-first requirement of the One-Form-of-Action rule does not preclude, as mentioned above, an action on a debt by a creditor whose security has been rendered worthless without any fault on the part of the creditor. Id., at 33-36. The most common example is the sold-out junior lienholder, whose security has been rendered worthless by foreclosure of a senior lien. Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal.2d at 39-44.

Legislative Update

Senate Bill (SB) 1178 was introduced in the California legislature on February 18, 2010. If enacted, SB 1178 would amend C.C.P. § 580b to extend anti-deficiency judgment protection to homeowners who have refinanced purchase-money loans which are secured by their residence. It would become effective on June 1, 2011 and apply only to actions filed after that date.

Bad-Faith Waste

California’s anti-deficiency statutes also do not bar actions for bad-faith waste, a judicially-created tort action which was first recognized in California in 1975, by the state supreme court. Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 15 Cal.3d 590 (1975).

The traditional definition of “waste” involves conduct by a person in possession of real property that impairs the value of the property, which serves as the lender’s security interest. Evans v. California Trailer Court, Inc., 28 C.A.4th 540 (1994).

Waste includes dimunition in value of real property which is caused solely or primarily as a result of economic pressures of a market depression.

Bad-faith waste, on the other hand, involves conduct which is “reckless,” “intentional,” or “malicious” and is distinguished from ordinary waste, which results from the neglect that occurs due to an owner’s financial inability to properly maintain real property. Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 15 Cal.3d at 604.

Loan Fraud

The One-Form-of-Action rule also does not bar an action for damages for fraud, if the action is brought by a person authorized by California to make or arrange loans, or by any subsidiary, affiliate, or successor in interest that originated the loan or purchased the loan or any interest in the loan, against a borrower for fraudulent conduct that induced the original lender to make a loan secured by a trust deed. Civil Code § 1572. Punitive damages are authorized in an amount equal to fifty percent (50%) of actual damages. C.C.P. § 726(f), (h); Financial Code §§ 779(a), 7460(a), 15102(a). This exception does not, however, apply to loans secured by single-family, owner-occupied residential real property if the property is actually occupied by the borrower as represented to the lender in order to obtain the loan and the loan was for less than $150,000, adjusted for inflation.

05.14.10

California Housing Discrimination (“Fair Housing”) Law (2010-11)

Posted in Constitutional and Civil Rights Law, Litigation, Real Estate Law at 18:38 by Administrator

Introduction

California housing discrimination law originated in 1959, with passage of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, which required all “business establishments” to provide “full and equal accommodations” regardless of race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin. In 1963, California passed the Rumford Fair Housing Act. The Fair Housing Act was expanded in 1988 and later, in 1993, amended to conform to federal housing discrimination law. The Act, as currently denominated, is known as the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).

Procedural Issues

The statute of limitations for filing a FEHA housing discrimination action is two years, and one year for a claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Any person or entity who can show an “injury in fact” has standing to sue. This includes rental applicants, tenants, the spouse of an applicant or tenant, or children or other adults who reside with the applicant or tenant, regardless of age or relationship.

Standing in housing discrimination cases also extends to “community-based” organizations whose “mission” is advancing “fair housing”, or who unilaterally assume a responsibility to investigate “fair housing” complaints.

Most FEHA provisions apply both to “owners” and “any person”. Thus, potential housing discrimination defendants include, for example, lessees, sublessees, assignees, managers, and real estate brokers and salespersons. “Person” includes individuals, corporations, legal representatives, trusts, unincorporated organizations, and the like.

Housing Discrimination Law

Protected classes for the purpose of housing discrimination law include the ususal classes: race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, and disability, but also include other classes, such as familial status (children), source of income, age, and occupation.

Prohibited acts include a refusal to sell, rent, or negotiate for housing; the provision of inferior terms, conditions or privileges relating to housing; discrimination in lending; and refusal to provide reasonable disability accommodation. Unlawful acts also include: falsely representing that housing is unavailable; inquiring about a person’s race or sexual orientation; or making any statement that indicates a preference, limitation, or discrimination for or against a protected class.

Proof of housing discrimination can be in the form of actual intent or adverse impact. In cases of intentional discrimination, a violation “may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence.” To successfully defend against a disparate impact case, the disputed practice must be shown to be “necessary to achieve an important purpose sufficiently compelling to override [its] discriminatory effect and effectively [carry] out the purpose it is alleged to serve.”

Damages

Housing discrimination plaintiffs may be awarded: (1) actual damages, (2) emotional distress damages, (3) injunctive relief, (4) punitive damages, and (5) attorney fees.

Actual damages include out-of-pocket expenses and lost housing opportunities. Out-of-pocket expenses may include moving, storage, or travel costs when alternative housing is sought; attorney fees paid to contest an eviction; wages lost to attend a court hearing, deposition, or trial; and other expenses incurred to file or prosecute a housing discrimination claim.

Organizational plaintiffs must prove that, rather than spending resources on its other work, it spent resources to redress the defendant’s discriminatory conduct, or that it will have to spend resources to counteract the harm caused by the defendant to the organization’s mission.

The FEHA also provides for awards of emotional distress damages which are caused by housing discrimination.

Under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff may be awarded “up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000), and any attorney fees that may be determined by the court in addition thereto.”

Injunctive relief, in the form of temporary or permanent restraining orders may also issue. Such orders may include “cease and desist” orders, orders requiring the development of non-discriminatory policies or procedures, or attendance at courses designed to prevent housing discrimination.

Punitive damages may also be awarded in appropriate cases. The FEHA does not provide for any “cap” on punitive damage awards, thus the only limit on such awards is that which is imposed by the requirements of constitutional due process.