Legal News
Constitutional and Civil Rights Law: Police Liability
Constitutional and Civil Rights Law: Police Liability
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Conn v. City of Reno (January 8, 2010)
Where officers witnessed detainee--who was being taken into
protective custody--wrap a seatbelt around her neck in an
apparent attempt to choke herself and then scream that they
should kill her or else she would kill herself--but failed to report
detainee killed herself less than 48 hours later, a reasonable
jury could have found such officers were liable for their
deliberate indifference to detainee’s medical needs, and thus
officers’ actions were a cause in fact and proximate cause of
detainee’s suicide. Jury could likewise have found city liable for
its failure to train its law enforcement officers or to implement
policies on suicide prevention and reporting.
Where officers witnessed detainee--who was being taken into
protective custody--wrap a seatbelt around her neck in an
apparent attempt to choke herself and then scream that they
should kill her or else she would kill herself--but failed to report
detainee killed herself less than 48 hours later, a reasonable
jury could have found such officers were liable for their
deliberate indifference to detainee’s medical needs, and thus
officers’ actions were a cause in fact and proximate cause of
detainee’s suicide. Jury could likewise have found city liable for
its failure to train its law enforcement officers or to implement
policies on suicide prevention and reporting.
Elliot-Park v. Manglona (January 12, 2010)
Law enforcement officers’ alleged failure to investigate a crime
or make an arrest due to victim and perpetrator’s race violated
equal protection. As the right to nondiscriminatory
administration of protective services was clearly established,
officers were not entitled to qualified immunity.
Law enforcement officers’ alleged failure to investigate a crime
or make an arrest due to victim and perpetrator’s race violated
equal protection. As the right to nondiscriminatory
administration of protective services was clearly established,
officers were not entitled to qualified immunity.
Mattos v. Agarano (January 12, 2010)
Officer responding to a 14-year-old girl’s 911 call reporting
domestic violence did not use excessive force by deploying
taser against plaintiff to remove her from her position blocking
officers from arresting her husband given the dangerous nature
of domestic violence situations, the close quarters in which
officers and plaintiffs were contained, husband’s intoxicated
state, and the contact--even if inadvertent--between plaintiff
and officer.
Officer responding to a 14-year-old girl’s 911 call reporting
domestic violence did not use excessive force by deploying
taser against plaintiff to remove her from her position blocking
officers from arresting her husband given the dangerous nature
of domestic violence situations, the close quarters in which
officers and plaintiffs were contained, husband’s intoxicated
state, and the contact--even if inadvertent--between plaintiff
and officer.
United States v. Vongxay (February 9, 2010)
Statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms does not
violate right to bear arms, due process, or equal protection.
Officer was entitled to ask defendant some questions, including
whether he would consent to a search, so long as the consent
was not coerced. Where defendant willingly lifted his arms to his
head in response to officer’s request for permission to search
him, such action constituted implied consent, and defendant’s
attempt to pull away after officer located a gun on his person
was an attempt at flight, not an indication of nonconsent.
Statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms does not
violate right to bear arms, due process, or equal protection.
Officer was entitled to ask defendant some questions, including
whether he would consent to a search, so long as the consent
was not coerced. Where defendant willingly lifted his arms to his
head in response to officer’s request for permission to search
him, such action constituted implied consent, and defendant’s
attempt to pull away after officer located a gun on his person
was an attempt at flight, not an indication of nonconsent.
Bull v. City and County of San Francisco (February 9, 2010)
City’s policy requiring strip searches of all arrestees classified
for custodial housing in the general population was facially
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, notwithstanding the
lack of individualized reasonable suspicion as to the individuals
searched, and district court erred in denying sheriff’s motion for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity and in granting
plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment as to Fourth
Amendment liability.
City’s policy requiring strip searches of all arrestees classified
for custodial housing in the general population was facially
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, notwithstanding the
lack of individualized reasonable suspicion as to the individuals
searched, and district court erred in denying sheriff’s motion for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity and in granting
plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment as to Fourth
Amendment liability.
Bryan v. McPherson (December 28, 2009)
Officer's use of a taser against plaintiff, without warning, during
a traffic stop for a seatbelt infraction was unconstitutionally
excessive where plaintiff was unarmed, never leveled a verbal
or physical threat against officer, was fifteen to twenty-five feet
away from officer, and evidence indicated that plaintiff was
facing away from officer.
Officer's use of a taser against plaintiff, without warning, during
a traffic stop for a seatbelt infraction was unconstitutionally
excessive where plaintiff was unarmed, never leveled a verbal
or physical threat against officer, was fifteen to twenty-five feet
away from officer, and evidence indicated that plaintiff was
facing away from officer.
Espinosa v. City and County of San Francisco (March 9, 2010)
District court properly denied defendants’ summary judgment
motion regarding whether officers who fatally shot houseguest
during warrantless search of apartment were entitled to
qualified immunity because there were genuine issues of fact
regarding whether the officers violated decedent’s Fourth
Amendment rights where defendants failed to show that
decedent did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, that
an emergency or exigent circumstance existed, or that there
were no questions of fact regarding whether security guard had
apparent authority to consent to search and implied such
consent. District court properly denied summary judgment
motion regarding whether officers were entitled to qualified
immunity for alleged excessive force because defendants failed
to show there were no questions of fact regarding whether use
of deadly force was reasonable where decedent had been
accused of no crime, was not a threat to the public and could
not escape, had not initially caused the situation, made no
threats, and had no weapon. District court properly denied
defendants’ summary judgment motion on whether officers were
entitled to qualified immunity for allegedly violating decedent’s
rights by intentionally or recklessly provoking a confrontation
where evidence strongly suggested officers’ initial entry into
apartment violated decedent’s rights, and there was evidence
the illegal entry created a situation that led to the shooting.
District court properly denied defendants’ summary judgment
motion regarding whether officers who fatally shot houseguest
during warrantless search of apartment were entitled to
qualified immunity because there were genuine issues of fact
regarding whether the officers violated decedent’s Fourth
Amendment rights where defendants failed to show that
decedent did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, that
an emergency or exigent circumstance existed, or that there
were no questions of fact regarding whether security guard had
apparent authority to consent to search and implied such
consent. District court properly denied summary judgment
motion regarding whether officers were entitled to qualified
immunity for alleged excessive force because defendants failed
to show there were no questions of fact regarding whether use
of deadly force was reasonable where decedent had been
accused of no crime, was not a threat to the public and could
not escape, had not initially caused the situation, made no
threats, and had no weapon. District court properly denied
defendants’ summary judgment motion on whether officers were
entitled to qualified immunity for allegedly violating decedent’s
rights by intentionally or recklessly provoking a confrontation
where evidence strongly suggested officers’ initial entry into
apartment violated decedent’s rights, and there was evidence
the illegal entry created a situation that led to the shooting.
Edgerly v. City and County of San Francisco (March 19, 2010)
Reasonable jury could find that officers' strip search of arrestee
violated the Fourth Amendment where he was arrested for
trespass and released.
Reasonable jury could find that officers' strip search of arrestee
violated the Fourth Amendment where he was arrested for
trespass and released.
Brooks v. City of Seattle (March 26, 2010)
An arrestee's resistance may support the use of force
regardless of whether probable cause existed, but probable
cause may be considered as a part of the totality of
circumstances affecting the excessive force analysis. Plaintiff's
refusal to sign a Notice of Infraction regarding her speeding
violation amounted to a violation of Seattle Municipal Code,
which was sufficient probable cause to arrest and detain
plaintiff until notice was issued; plaintiff's conduct during this
initial detention gave officers probable cause to place her
under custodial arrest since plaintiff's undisputedly
uncooperative behavior would have led a reasonable prudent
person to believe she was obstructing officers in their attempts
to complete the traffic stop. Quantum of force used was less
than an intermediate application of force where Taser was in
"drive-stun" mode, which only created temporary and localized
pain, without incapacitating muscle contractions or significant
lasting injury; such less-than intermediate use of force,
prefaced by warnings and other attempts to obtain compliance,
against a suspect accused of a minor crime but actively
resisting arrest, out of police control, and posing some slight
threat to officers did not amount to a constitutional violation.
An arrestee's resistance may support the use of force
regardless of whether probable cause existed, but probable
cause may be considered as a part of the totality of
circumstances affecting the excessive force analysis. Plaintiff's
refusal to sign a Notice of Infraction regarding her speeding
violation amounted to a violation of Seattle Municipal Code,
which was sufficient probable cause to arrest and detain
plaintiff until notice was issued; plaintiff's conduct during this
initial detention gave officers probable cause to place her
under custodial arrest since plaintiff's undisputedly
uncooperative behavior would have led a reasonable prudent
person to believe she was obstructing officers in their attempts
to complete the traffic stop. Quantum of force used was less
than an intermediate application of force where Taser was in
"drive-stun" mode, which only created temporary and localized
pain, without incapacitating muscle contractions or significant
lasting injury; such less-than intermediate use of force,
prefaced by warnings and other attempts to obtain compliance,
against a suspect accused of a minor crime but actively
resisting arrest, out of police control, and posing some slight
threat to officers did not amount to a constitutional violation.
Camp v. State of California (May 18, 2010)
Police officer responding to a car accident owed no duty to
passenger where officer left passenger in the same position
she was in when officer arrived and honored passenger’s
repeated assurances that passenger was not injured and did
not want an ambulance called. Law enforcement personnel do
not acquire a duty of care toward a citizen by responding to a
request for assistance, undertaking an investigation, or
managing the scene of an accident. Officer’s order for car’s
passengers to leave the scene of the accident after the group
had already arranged for transportation was not the cause in
fact of passenger’s injury.
Police officer responding to a car accident owed no duty to
passenger where officer left passenger in the same position
she was in when officer arrived and honored passenger’s
repeated assurances that passenger was not injured and did
not want an ambulance called. Law enforcement personnel do
not acquire a duty of care toward a citizen by responding to a
request for assistance, undertaking an investigation, or
managing the scene of an accident. Officer’s order for car’s
passengers to leave the scene of the accident after the group
had already arranged for transportation was not the cause in
fact of passenger’s injury.